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Adverse drug events cause a large number of injuries, and adverse events caused by medications administered in the face of
known allergies represent an important preventable cause of patient harm. Computerized systems can eﬀectively prevent reactions
due to known allergies, but building an eﬀective allergy prevention feature is challenging and presents many interesting informatics
issues that have both methodological and operational implications. In this paper, we present the experiences from one large delivery
system in delivering allergy-related decision support, discuss some of the diﬀerent approaches that we have used, and then propose a
future approach. We also discuss the methodological, behavioral, and operational issues that have arisen which have a major impact
on success. Key factors in drug-allergy checking include storing patient allergy data in a single common repository, representing
allergy data using suitable terminologies and creating groups of allergies for inferencing purposes, being judicious about which
allergy warnings to display, conveying the reaction that the patient has experienced when exposed to the drug to inform the provider
of the importance of the warning, and perhaps most important, implementing strategies to optimize the likelihood that allergy
information will be entered.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The recent IOM reports, To Err is Human [1], and
Crossing the Quality Chasm [2] presented evidence that
the quality of health care in the United States could be
substantially better. The medication use process was
speciﬁcally mentioned as an important aspect of health
care that currently is fraught with error and opportu-
nities for improvement. The reports made broad rec-
ommendations for changes that might improve health
care quality, and information technology was cited as an
important tool that could improve medication use and
other aspects of care. In particular, it was noted that
changes to the current medication use process might
reduce the frequency of adverse drug events, an unde-
sirable outcome of care.* Corresponding author. Fax: +1-617-731-3690.
E-mail address: gkuperman@partners.org (G.J. Kuperman).
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doi:10.1016/S1532-0464(03)00063-7Adverse drug events (ADEs) and medication errors
have been studied extensively [3–5], and known allergic
reactions represent an important cause of preventable
ADEs [3]. Important root causes of medication errors in
general include knowledge deﬁcits, failure to access key
pieces of information, and failure to track or enter key
pieces of information such as allergies. In one study of
inpatient medications errors [4], 8% of errors were pre-
ventable because it was known at the time of the pre-
scription that the patient was allergic to the medication
being ordered. In one outpatient study, 13% of ADEs
identiﬁed by chart review were caused by the patient
receiving a medication to which they had a known al-
lergy [6]. Information technology and allergy decision
support has the potential to address errors related to
allergy issues. For example, in one study of the impact
of computerized physician order entry (CPOE, including
allergy alerts), the rate of known allergy errors de-
creased by 56% (p ¼ 0:009) [7].
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agement processes in the inpatient setting can explain
the prevalence of allergy-related errors. Standard prac-
tice dictates that physicians inquire about the patients
allergies on admission to the hospital. Elicited allergy
information is handwritten on the admission orders.
Usually, there is no backup system if the physician
forgets to elicit or document the patients allergies. From
the admission orders, the allergy information is sup-
posed to be transferred onto subsequent blank ordering
sheets. This is the responsibility of the unit secretary,
although other providers also may add order sheets to
the order book. The presence of the handwritten allergy
information on the order sheet (assuming it is present
and legible) is supposed to serve as a visual cue to the
ordering physician that an allergy is present. Such a cue
provides feeble support to the physicians memory or to
a covering physician who is unfamiliar with the patient.
The allergy information from the order sheets is
supposed to be transferred to paper-based nursing
documents (e.g., the Kardex, the medication adminis-
tration record) so that nurses can be aware of the allergy
information, however, the nursing-oriented processes
suﬀer the same limitations as physician-oriented pro-
cesses. Also, many institutions require the nurse, in ad-
dition to the physician, to elicit patient allergy
information. However, there rarely is a process to rec-
oncile data captured by the nurse and data captured by
the physician. This situation can lead to confusion and
rework. The paper-based system is not able to inform
the physician that certain drugs may cause a reaction
even if the patient is allergic to a drug in another class
(i.e., that there is cross-reactivity between certain drug
classes). Most paper-based systems are not designed to
inform the physician of what is the allergic reaction that
the patient suﬀers when exposed to the drug (e.g., mild
nausea, anaphylaxis, etc.). All these factors increase the
risk of patients suﬀering needless allergic reactions.
In contrast, an automated allergy management sys-
tem embedded within a clinical information system can
overcome many of the shortcomings of the paper-based
approach and can prevent errors and decrease the fre-
quency of ADEs. For example, once entered, allergies
can be displayed in multiple places in the clinical in-
formation system. Physicians can be prompted interac-
tively if they forget to document the patients allergyTable 1
Components of a drug-allergy interaction (DAI) checking module
• Allergy documentation feature and the database of patient allergies
• Terminologies to encode medications, ingredients, allergies, the reactions
• Knowledge base of relationships between medications that informs drug
with cephalosporins, etc.)
• Inference engine to decide whether a DAI is present
• User interface to present alerts to the prescribing physicianstatus, and the patients reaction can be a required at-
tribute of the allergy record. The prescribing module can
automatically perform drug-allergy checking. Viewed
simplistically, a drug-allergy checking feature compares
the drug being ordered to the patients electronic allergy
list and informs the physician if an interaction exists
between the two. Such a feature helps assure that the
physician does not inadvertently overlook the patients
allergies.
From the informatics perspective, building a drug-
allergy checking feature may appear simple. However,
making such a feature work eﬀectively has a number of
requirements, which bring up important and interrelated
methodological and operational issues. In this paper, we
discuss the key components of drug-allergy checking
systems with a particular focus on the methodological
issues that are encountered in the construction, evalua-
tion, and improvement of such systems. We begin with a
general discussion of these modules, then present some
experiences in our organization with drug-allergy
checking, and then discuss a future plan for drug-allergy
checking that we hope will address some of the problems
encountered with earlier versions.2. Components of a drug-allergy checking module
When considered in detail, a drug-allergy checking
module is composed of several interacting components
(Table 1). Each component must be designed carefully
to assure that the feature provides meaningful assistance
to the physician.
• Allergy documentation feature and a patient allergy
database. For a drug-allergy checking system to func-
tion, patient allergy data must have been stored prior
to medication ordering. Most EMR and CPOE appli-
cations include allergy documentation features, as do
many nurse charting and pharmacy applications. The
important attributes of a patient allergy record are
the medication or ingredient to which the patient is
allergic, as well as the reaction that the patient expe-
riences when exposed to the allergen (e.g., rash, nau-
sea, anaphylaxis, etc.). Additional inferencing is
possible if the reaction is entered in coded form. An
example of an allergy documentation screen is shown
in Fig. 1.that a patient may suﬀer as the results of an allergic reaction to a drug
-allergy checking (e.g., ampicillin is-a penicillin, penicillins cross-react
Fig. 1. Allergy documentation screen from Massachusetts General Hospital order entry application. Note coded pick lists of common allergies and
reactions. Allergies not appearing on the list can be selected by choosing ‘‘other.’’ A selector function appears that lets user select from a much larger
coded list.
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checking to function, medications and allergies both
must be stored in a coded form. The majority of elec-
tronic medical records (EMR) and CPOE applica-
tions use vendor-supplied dictionaries of ingredients
(i.e., chemical compounds) to represent medications
and allergies.1
• A knowledge-based of semantic links between ingre-
dients. Many drug database vendors supply a knowl-
edge base of semantic links that organize ingredients
into various relationships. Some links establish hier-
archical groups (e.g., nafcillin and ampicillin are pen-
icillins). Other links establish cross-sensitivity
relationships between groups (e.g., penicillins and
cephalosporins cross-react). The semantic links allow
a drug-allergy checking function to infer a that a1 Allergies are best represented as ingredients. Most medications
contain only one active ingredient (e.g., penicillin) so documenting that
the patient is allergic to the medication penicillin is the same as stating
that the patient is allergic to the ingredient penicillin. Some medica-
tions contain more than one active ingredient (e.g., Bactrim contains
trimethoprim and sulfmethoxazole). If the patient is stated to be
allergic to ‘‘Bactrim,’’ many applications will represent that as an
allergy to the ingredient sulfmethoxazole and an allergy to to the
ingredient trimethoprim.drug-allergy interaction is present even if the ingredi-
ent deﬁned in the allergy is not exactly the same as an
ingredient in the ordered medication.
• The drug-allergy inferencing function. This is the
module that compares the medication being ordered
with the patients allergy list. A drug-allergy is in-
ferred if there is an exact match between the medica-
tion and an allergy, or if the semantic link knowledge
base implies that an interaction is present.
• Drug-allergy alert screen. In an EMR or CPOE appli-
cation, if a drug-allergy interaction is deemed to be
present, the provider is informed immediately via a
drug-allergy alert screen. An example of a drug-al-
lergy alert screen is shown in Fig. 2. A drug-allergy
alert screen displays details of the alert (i.e., the drug
being ordered, the drug to which the patient is aller-
gic, and the patients documented reaction that oc-
curred when the patient was exposed to this drug in
the past) and oﬀers 2 options: cancel the medication
being ordered (i.e., ‘‘accept’’ the alert), or continue
with the prescription despite the alert (i.e., keep the
medication, or ‘‘override’’ the alert).
If the physician chooses to override the alert, the
screen may allow the provider to enter a reason for
override. The reason for override is useful information
Fig. 2. The display of a drug-allergy interaction in the Brigham and Womens Hospital CPOE application. The patient has a documented allergy to
‘‘penicillins’’ and the medication being ordered is ampicillin. If the physician chooses to ‘‘keep’’ the order, he will be presented with a free text ﬁeld in
which to enter the reason for the override.
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mation and displayed to nurses and pharmacists
downstream in the medication process as an indicator of
the physicians thoughts at the time of the prescription.
The override data can also be audited and analyzed for
quality improvement initiatives.
The design of the alert screen raises several human
factors issues. Each alert may contain a lot of relevant
data (e.g., allergy, potential reaction [and attendant se-
riousness], who entered the allergy data, when was it
entered, what is the medication that triggered the alert,
is the alert due to an exact drug-allergy match or to a
cross-sensitivity, etc.). Tradeoﬀs exist, and the valua-
tions used to make these tradeoﬀs may vary based on an
individuals personal perspective; only rarely are these
values explicitly identiﬁed and validated.
• Reverse-allergy checking. In addition to checking for
drug-allergy interactions at the time that a newmedica-
tion order is entered, it is also possible to check for such
interactions when a new patient allergy is documented
(in this case the newly documented allergy is compared
with the existingmedication list). Such a ‘‘reverse-aller-
gy’’ checking feature [8] assures that physicians are in-
formed about interacting medications when newallergies are documented. At our institution, there
had been anecdotes of oﬀendingmedications not being
discontinued at the time the allergy was documented.
The reverse-allergy checking feature was implemented
to minimize the likelihood of these occurrences.
In addition to the technical components of a drug-
allergy checking module, operational issues need to be
considered to assure that this important feature func-
tions well. For example, many health care workers may
be well suited from a workﬂow perspective to obtain
allergy history data from the patient. Examples include
emergency room triage clerks, medical assistants in
outpatient clinics, nurses, physicians, and others. How-
ever, some clinicians believe that only speciﬁc categories
of professionals should be able to enter or edit allergy
information. Organizations need to have policies about
who can contribute to the patients electronic allergy list
and be sure that those people are skilled in taking an
allergy history and in the use of the allergy documen-
tation feature. Our perspective is that it is suﬃciently
hard to get allergy information so that it is better to
allow more groups of professionals to enter the infor-
mation; the accuracy of entered data remains a concern
no matter who is doing the entering.
Table 3
Analysis of reasons entered by clinicians for overriding one drug-
allergy alert
• Has tolerated in past—349 (33%)
• ‘‘Aware’’—278 (27%)
• Will monitor/follow—159 (15%)
• Not really allergic—68 (7%)
• Other—189 (18%)
One weeks worth of data from BWH. Total reasons ana-
lyzed¼ 1043.
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current state
Drug-allergy checking has been implemented in
several EMR, CPOE, and pharmacy applications in-
cluding those at Partners HealthCare System, a large
integrated delivery network in Boston that includes the
Brigham and Womens Hospital (BWH) and the Mas-
sachusetts General Hospital (MGH). BWH and MGH
are both large academic medical centers; Partners also
includes several specialty and community hospitals, and
a large physician network. BWH implemented CPOE in
1993 [9]. In 2000, we performed an evaluation of drug-
allergy checking in the CPOE application at BWH [10].
At that time [10], we noted that approximately 80% of
the drug-allergy alerts were being overridden, up from
approximately 50% ﬁve years earlier. Further analysis
revealed that the increase was due to changes in the
medication renewal policy (drug-allergy alerts are pre-
sented at the time of medication renewals, as well as at
the time of medication initiation), the growth of the
patient allergy database, and evolution of the medica-
tion dictionaries and the cross-sensitivity knowledge
base. Alerting systems can be thought of as screening
tests, which have characteristic sensitivities and speci-
ﬁcities. Other studies have documented high rates of
overrides of drug-allergy and other critical drug inter-
action alerts [11]. We were concerned that the appar-
ently poor speciﬁcity of our drug-allergy alerting
feature might cause physicians to consider the alerts
unhelpful, ignore them, and possibly overlook an im-
portant clinical alert thus defeating the goal of the
feature [12]. These data motivated us to undertake a
detailed examination with the goal of improving drug-
allergy checking at our institution.
We decided to analyze not only the BWH CPOE
application, but also the CPOE application at the
MGH, and the outpatient electronic medical records
application in use in many outpatient clinics at Partners
known as the Longitudinal Medical Record (LMR). For
various technical and organizational reasons, the drug-
allergy checking features of BWH CPOE, MGH CPOE,
and the LMR were developed separately and had dif-
ferent behaviors. Also, the three applications main-
tained separate allergy databases.Table 2
Comparison of drug-allergy related features in the various Partners clinical
BWH CPOE
Reaction that the patient experiences when exposed
to the allergen
Not coded,
Reason to override drug-allergy alert Required, n
Cross-sensitivity checking present in the application? Yes
Reverse-allergy checking present in the application? YesOur analysis revealed the following characteristics
of the drug-allergy systems of the three applications
(Table 2):
• Allergy documentation. All three applications re-
quired the allergy to be entered in a coded form,
and all three used the same coding scheme. MGH
CPOE and the LMR required the reaction to be en-
tered in a coded form; BWH CPOE allowed for entry
of an uncoded reaction, but did not require it. As
mentioned, the three applications stored allergy re-
cords in diﬀerent structures in diﬀerent databases.
The applications used the same allergy identiﬁers (in-
gredient dictionary).
• Drug-allergy inferencing and use of semantic links.
All three applications used a vendor-supplied knowl-
edge base of hierarchical semantic links (e.g., ampi-
cillin is a member of the group Penicillins).
However, only BWH CPOE was making use of
the vendor-supplied cross-sensitivity links (e.g., if
patient is allergic to penicillin, generate an alert if
a cephalosporin is ordered). Data from Abookire
et al. [10], noted that a large fraction of the drug-
allergy alerts at BWH were due to these cross-sensi-
tivity links (e.g., lasix ordered in presence of a sulfa
allergy).
Also, only BWH CPOE had implemented reverse-
allergy checking. Neither MGH CPOE nor the LMR
had implemented this feature.
• Drug-allergy alert screen. The three applications had
similar appearing drug-allergy alert screens. Fig. 2
shows the drug-allergy alert screen from BWH
CPOE. The other applications have diﬀerent imple-
mentations of the screen, but the screen behavior is
generally similar across the three applications. If theapplications
LMR MGH CPOE
not required Coded, required Coded required
ot coded No override reason
required
Required not coded
No No
No Yes
Table 4
Recommendations for improving drug-allergy alerting, and associated methodological issues
Recommendation Methodological issues
Merge legacy databases; create a single common
allergy repository
• Match patient, allergy identiﬁers
• Get agreement on usage of terms (e.g., NKA vs. NKDA)
• Each application must ‘‘trust’’ other applications to maintain accuracy of allergy
database
Assure consistent functionality among applications
(i.e., require coded reaction data, include
cross-sensitivity checking, include reverse-allergy
checking, require coded override reasons)
• Must capture reaction data in coded form
• Oﬀer physicians opportunity to delete an allergy as part of the workﬂow if override
reason is ‘‘has tolerated in past’’
• Decide whether its worth showing a drug-allergy alert multiple times if the same drug,
same patient, and same physician are involved
Suppress certain cross-sensitivity checks • Understand the knowledge base vendors editorial policy
• Create a local editorial policy to remove certain cross-sensitivity checks
• Review overrides on a regular basis to determine if certain parts of the knowledge base
do not reﬂect good clinical thinking
Tailor drug-allergy alert screen based on documented
reaction
• Understand cognitive issues in users response to alert screens
Improve allergy documentation • Issues in allowing patient to document allergies via Internet
• Try to infer situations in which an allergy might have occurred (e.g., Benadryl order)
and ask physician if allergy has occurred
• Determining the accuracy of the allergy database at any point in time
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CPOE applications required the physician to enter a
free text reason; the LMR did not require an override
reason.
• Analysis of override reasons. To better understand why
drug-allergy alerts were overridden, we analyzed one
weeks worth of data. In a 7-day period in June 2002,
1043 drug-allergy alerts were overridden in the BWH
CPOE application. Each override required free text
to be entered explaining the reason for the override.
A rough analysis allowed 854 (82%) of the 1043 free
text reasons to be easily categorized. The results are
shown in Table 3. Interestingly, in at least 40% of the
overrides, the clinician gave as the reason ‘‘has toler-
ated in past’’ (33%) or ‘‘not really allergic’’ (7%).
As shown in Table 2, there was signiﬁcant inconsis-
tency across the 3 applications, which presented a po-
tential quality of care issue. Also, each application
stored the allergy data it captured its own application-
speciﬁc database.2 Applications will continue to be documented through workﬂow
applications such as CPOE and the LMR. In addition to sending
allergy data to the common repository, each workﬂow application may
choose to store allergy data in its application-speciﬁc transactional
database as well. For example, an allergy record documented via the
BWH CPOE application may be stored in the BWH CPOE database
(as well as in the allergy repository) if CPOE wants to show allergies as
part of orders that were entered in a given ‘‘session.’’ However, the list
of allergies stored by any one application will only be a partial picture
of the patients complete allergy list.4. Plan for improving drug-allergy checking at partners
The above analysis resulted in a number of recom-
mendations for improvement, which fell into 5 broad
categories (Table 4).
4.1. Recommendation 1
Create a single allergy database to serve all clinical
applications at Partners.The most glaring problem that we noted in our
analysis was that there are multiple application-based
allergy repositories at Partners. Thus, if a patient had an
allergy documented as an outpatient in the LMR and
then presented as an inpatient at either BWH or MGH,
the LMR allergy data would not be available to the
inpatient CPOE applications. Because of the way aller-
gies are represented in the various applications, allergy
data entered in one application cannot easily be used by
another application. Thus, we plan to:
• Merge the existing allergy repositories into a common
allergy repository.
• Use the common repository as the ‘‘source of truth’’
for the patients allergy list and for drug-allergy
checking.
• Store all new patient allergy data in the common al-
lergy repository.2
These recommendations had several methodological
implications. Most importantly, the applications now
have to agree on the use and deﬁnition of important
concepts. Previously, each application was free to decide
on its own how to address complex or ambiguous issues
and, as a result, there were subtle distinctions in the
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example, to document the known absence of patient
allergies, BWH CPOE allowed the physician to docu-
ment ‘‘no known drug allergies (NKDA)’’; MGH CPOE
allowed the physician to document ‘‘no known allergies
(NKA)’’; the LMR allowed either. User committees
from all three applications have been engaged, and the
decision has been made to allow only ‘‘no known al-
lergies of any kind’’ to be documented. It was diﬃcult to
get the user groups to abandon long-held opinions
about such matters.
Also, the existing legacy allergy records from the
three applications have to be merged into a single da-
tabase. Fortunately, the three applications use the same
patient identiﬁer table and the same allergy identiﬁers,
so creating mappings of these concepts will not be re-
quired. If the patient is allergic to one compound in
one database and a completely diﬀerent compound in
another database, these two records will be stored as
distinct allergies. However, it could be the case that the
patient has allergies in two databases that are ‘‘relat-
ed.’’ For example, the patient may be allergic to
‘‘penicillin’’ in one database and ‘‘ampicillin’’ in an-
other. We will need to decide which allergy identiﬁer to
store. It probably would not be reasonable from a
clinical perspective to store the records as 2 completely
distinct allergies, although that is possible technically.
Also, the patient may be allergic to penicillin in one
database with the reaction of ‘‘rash,’’ and may be al-
lergic to penicillin in another database with the reac-
tion of ‘‘hives’’; in such cases of multiple diﬀerent
reactions, we will store multiple reactions with each
allergy record.
Also, each application now needs to trust that the
users of other applications will maintain the patients
allergy list accurately. For example, if an allergy is en-
tered via MGH CPOE, it could be modiﬁed or deleted
by someone using the LMR. Each application is in-
volved in an implicit tradeoﬀ: that the risk assumed by
giving up control of the allergy database will be more
than balanced by the presence of more complete allergy
data. We presume that this tradeoﬀ is a net beneﬁt, but
this assumption should be conﬁrmed.
4.2. Recommendation 2
Improve consistency across applications of behavior
of allergy-related functions.
One of our key ﬁndings was that the three applica-
tions had important diﬀerences in their behavior. Some
clinicians rotate between the BWH and MGH, and thus
might use both CPOE applications. Also, at each insti-
tution, many physicians use CPOE in the inpatient set-
ting and the LMR in the outpatient setting. Inconsistent
behavior of the allergy documentation or drug-allergy
alert screen creates a potential for user error.To promote consistency and increased safety, we
recommended that the each of the applications be en-
hanced as follows:
• The patients reaction to the oﬀending medication
data be a required and coded attribute of the allergy
record (we will explain why shortly).
• Drug-allergy checking include cross-sensitivity check-
ing because many cross-reactions are important clin-
ically.
• Applications should include reverse-allergy checking
when new allergies are documented.
• Physicians be required to enter a coded reason to
override a drug-allergy alert so that other providers
e.g., nurses and pharmacists, can know the MDs
thinking at the time of the prescription and that mean-
ingful analyses of override reasons can be performed.
The above recommendations bring up several meth-
odological issues. It will be important for decision sup-
port reasons to be able to diﬀerentiate among the
diﬀerent categories of ‘‘allergic’’ reactions. In fact, many
reactions often denoted as ‘‘allergies’’ would more ac-
curately be called ‘‘sensitivities’’ (e.g., nausea due to
codeine). Many sensitivities apply only to one medica-
tion within a class, while many allergies—especially se-
vere ones such as anaphylaxis, may call for class-wide
warnings. Some clinicians and pharmacists have sug-
gested that clinical information systems require users to
explicitly distinguish between allergies and sensitivities.
We do not agree with this approach and have instead
made this distinction based on the type of reaction (e.g.,
nausea is a sensitivity, not an allergy) since many clini-
cians do not accurately make the distinction. For the
foregoing reasons, we believe it is important to capture
the speciﬁc patient reaction in coded form.
If physicians override an alert and give as the reason
‘‘patient has tolerated in past’’ or ‘‘not really allergic,’’
the quality of the allergy data is called into question and
we may want to suggest that they modify the patients
allergy list. This would require that the override reason
be coded. Also, if the physician has overridden an alert
for a given drug on a given patient, and that physician
orders the same drug for the same patient, one could
argue that it is not worth showing the alert the 2nd time.
These are all issues that will need to be examined as we
move forward.
4.3. Recommendation 3
Modify hierarchical and cross-sensitivity semantic
knowledge base.
The data from the study by Abookire et al. [10],
indicated that a large fraction of the drug-allergy alerts
were generated by a small number of drug-allergy
pairs. Several clinicians at our institution with experi-
ence in medication safety wondered whether some of
these frequently-occurring interactions were clinically
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furosemide-sulfa interaction (i.e., furosemide ordered in
the presence of a sulfa allergy; 12% of drug-allergy
alerts [10]) and various of the narcotic groupings (e.g.,
alert to Percocet or morphine in the presence of co-
deine allergy).
A proposal was made to remove these semantic links
from the ingredient knowledge base and thus prevent
these alerts from occurring. A review of the literature
about the clinical relevance of these interactions re-
vealed scant information. The Partners Pharmacy
Committee was in favor of removing these, however felt
it would be worthwhile to try to understand whether or
not the overriding of these alerts in fact leads to adverse
events. We currently are carrying out a study to deter-
mine whether override of furosemide-sulfa, narcotics-
related, or other drug-allergy interaction alerts leads to
adverse events.
These recommendations raise several issues in the
management of drug-allergy alerts. First, if a vendor
knowledge-base of semantic links is used, there should
be local awareness of the vendors editorial policy for
maintaining the knowledge. Also, if there will be local
modiﬁcation of the semantic knowledge, there needs to
be some process for knowledge management. Finally, if
alerts arising from a particular semantic link are over-Fig. 3. Prototype of a screen that might be used to converidden at a high rate and no adverse consequences are
noted as a result, the value of the link should be called
into question and reviewed either by the vendor or by a
local committee. There should be an ongoing formal
process to review overrides; such a process would help
improve the knowledge-base and the speciﬁcity of the
alerts.
4.4. Recommendation 4
Tailor alerts based on coded reactions.
Currently, we display the same alert screen whether
the documented reaction is to the allergy is nausea or
anaphylaxis. In recognition of the fact that anaphylaxis
is a much more serious clinical situation, we have
proposed creating alert screens with diﬀerent appear-
ances based on the documented reaction. As men-
tioned earlier, this would require us to consistently
capture a coded reaction; although many of our ap-
plications do this, currently BWH CPOE does not
capture coded data. Alerts screens then could be tai-
lored based on the reaction, and a more emphatic
screen could be used to communicate the presence of
potential anaphylaxis as opposed to rash. Fig. 3 shows
a prototype of a screen intended to convey the fact
that the alert is very serious.y a very serious interaction. Compare with Fig. 2.
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screen, we want to be sure that all the information is
clear to the user (in this case, a physician). We want to
assure that they have clearly and accurately perceived
the information on the alert screen so that they make
their decision (cancel or keep the prescription) for the
right reasons. Ideally, we would perform usability
studies to understand the users cognitive experience
[13].
There are some issues associated with these recom-
mendations. First, although human factors work sug-
gests that diﬀerence in appearance may impact behavior
[14], that presumption should be empirically tested.
Also, even though we intend to convey that one class of
events is more ‘‘serious’’ than another, we need to
conﬁrm that physicians in fact perceive the diﬀerences as
such. An increased understanding of screen usability
and human cognition of automated interfaces is critical
as the use of decision support expands [15].
4.5. Recommendation 5
Improve allergy documentation.
Meaningful drug-allergy checking requires the pres-
ence of an accurate allergy patient database. Evidence
exists that such databases are often disturbingly inac-
curate. Wagner documented general inaccuracy in EMR
databases [16]. Also, a study by Bates et al. [7] docu-
mented that when new allergic reactions occur in hos-
pitalized patients, they are documented in the hospitals
computer system only 16% of the time. Our analysis of
override reasons in the BWH CPOE system, physicians
indicated that they doubted the allergy data at least 40%
of the time (Table 3). This may indicate that allergy
databases are missing important data, and also that
many allergies that have been entered do not represent
true allergies or sensitivities.
There are various ways that the accuracy of the al-
lergy database could be improved. When a medication is
discontinued, the provider could be asked for the reason
why. If the reason is an allergic or other untoward re-
action, that fact could be added to the allergy database.
This would reduce the number of true allergies not in the
patient database. Also, certain medications (e.g., di-
phenhydramine, and to a lesser extent, topical steroids)
often are ordered in response to an allergic reaction. The
system could ask the physician, when these medications
are ordered, whether an allergic reaction has taken
place. This too might increase the number of true al-
lergies in the database.
As mentioned, if a drug-allergy alert is overridden,
and the coded reason for the override is ‘‘not really an
allergy,’’ or ‘‘patient has tolerated in the past,’’ the
provider could be asked whether they want this allergy
removed from the patient database. Another possibility
would be to ask patients to enter their own allergies, forexample using an Internet-based application to com-
municate with their health care providers. While these
might be inaccurate, and would likely require validation
by a provider, patients have a large investment in en-
suring that their own information is complete.
The above measures could presumably improve the
quality and completeness of the patient allergy database,
but studies are needed to assess the extent to which this
may be the case. Also, it still would be diﬃcult to know
the accuracy of the database at any point in time. Such a
study would require personal interviews and review of
multiple data sources and comparison with the com-
puter database.5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have described the experience at one
large health care institution, but we think these basic
concepts will also be important for other organizations.
To have excellent performance, we think that organi-
zations should represent allergies in a single location,
since allergies for an individual will be transportable
across locations. They must be represented using com-
munication and content standards, so that they will be
available to a variety of applications. Many cross-sen-
sitivities are not suﬃciently important to merit display.
To improve results regarding heeding of important
warnings, it will be important to display warnings that
convey to providers the level of importance of the
warning. Perhaps the most diﬃcult issue is getting the
data in, and it will be essential to make documentation
of allergies easy and perhaps also to use additional
strategies such as prompting clinicians when it appears
likely that the patient may have had a reaction, or to
have patients enter some of their own allergies. From
the methodological perspective, key issues relate to
representing data in ways that facilitate integration and
access from multiple sites, as well as facilitating cross-
checking, and using human factors techniques to in-
crease the likelihood that the decision support will result
in best decisions for the individual patient.Acknowledgments
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